78 Years To Life Not Cruel Or Unusual

The Eighth Amendment and its California counterpart have gotten lots of judicial attention lately, although most claims have been unsuccessful. In People v. Haller (here), a sentence of 78 years to life was held not to violate the federal or state constitutions. The defendant was found guilty of a number of felonies involving threats to his ex-wife and her current husband and assault with a deadly weapon on the husband, and also had two prior serious felonies. Given the defendant's age, the sentence amounted to life without possibility of parole. Nevertheless, the court upheld the sentence due to the seriousness of the offenses and the defendant's prior record.

The decision contains language that minimizes the interjurisdictional component of the test for determining whether a California sentence is cruel or unusual: "In any event, the fact that defendant’s current offenses might not qualify for recidivist sentencing in other states does not render the California punishment cruel or unusual. “That California’s punishment scheme is among the most extreme does not compel the conclusion that it is unconstitutionally cruel or unusual. This state constitutional consideration does not require California to march in lockstep with other states in fashioning a penal code. It does not require ‘conforming our Penal Code to the “majority rule” or the least common denominator of penalties nationwide.’” (Martinez, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 1516; accord, Sullivan, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 573.)

Thus, the decision contains little that is new, and continues the erosion of federal or state constitutional limits on California's draconian sentencing laws. Haller is no doubt a dangerous felon, but wouldn't 50 years to life be enough? Do we really want a prison system full of elderly and sick inmates?

LWOP For Kidnapping Cruel And Unusual

In a welcome change from recent decisions that had adopted a restrictive reading of the California Constitution's "cruel or unusual punishment" clause, the Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, has held in In re Nunez (here) than an LWOP sentence imposed on a kidnapper who was 14 at the time of the offense where the victim was not murdered amounts to cruel or unusual punishment under the California Constitution (as well as cruel and unusual punishment under the federal constitution's Eighth Amendment). The court was influenced by the fact that LWOP is not available for first degree murder, even with special circumstances, where the offender was 14 at the time of the crime, and by the fact that the sentence was apparently unique to California, the United States and the world.

Another 50-Year To Life Sentence Upheld

Another 50-year-to-life sentence has been upheld by the Court of Appeal. In People v. Uecker (here), the Court of Appeal upheld a sentence of fifty-years to life for a defendant convicted of stalking two women, because he had four strike priors. Most troubling is the court's dismissal of appellant's claim that the sentence was harsh compared to comparable sentences in other states. "Simply because California’s law might be among the harshest, it does not make it unconstitutional. Otherwise, California could never take the toughest stance against repeat offenders or any other type of criminal conduct." This reads this test for determining cruel or unusual punishment right out of the case law.

Court of Appeal Divides Over Cruel Or Unusual Punishment Case

Do judges matter? Or, to put it more precisely, do the backgrounds, predilections and perhaps the gender of judges matter? Of course they do. Just look, for example, at the decision in People v. Em (here). In that case the defendant, who was less than 16 at the time of the offense, was a somewhat passive participant in a robbery, and the other robber shot and killed the victim. Found guilty of murder under the felony murder doctrine, the defendant was sentenced to fifty years to life, with two twenty-five year to life sentences running consecutively. The majority opinion focuses on the particulars of the crime, which were pretty bad. The dissent focuses on the defendant's background, and provides numerous facts that don't appear in the majority opinion. And the tone of the two opinions is quite different as well.

I don't know enough about the cases construing the California Constitution's "cruel or unusual punishment" clause to know which of the two opinions is right. But it is troubling that the majority opinion doesn't acknowledge the facts discussed in the dissent. Conversely, it's troubling that the dissent doesn't come to grips with People v. Gonzales, the principal case relied on by the majority, in which an identical sentence was upheld under somewhat similar circumstances. Perhaps the California Supreme Court will intervene to bring some clarity and more objective standards to this area of the law.

Court of Appeal Clarifies Duties to Prisoners

In Giraldo v. CDCR (here), the Court of Appeal has decided several important issues relating to tort claims brought by prisoners. First, the court held that prison officials owe a "special duty of care" to protect prisoners from assaults by third parties (i.e., fellow prisoners) that can be breached by negligent conduct on the part of the officials. While there was no California case on point, the court analogized the relationship between prisoner and jailer to other "special relationships" where, because of the plaintiff's vulnerability, a duty to protect against foreseeable harm caused by third parties exists. The conclusion reached by the court is also supported by the Restatement and several decisions from courts in other states.

Second, the court held that there is no private right of action for damages for a violation of the "cruel or unusual punishment" clause of the California Constitution, Article I, Section 17. Relying heavily on Katzberg v. Regents, 29 Cal. 4th 300 (2002), where the Supreme Court had held that there was no cause of action for damages for a violation of the State Constitution's due process clause, the court in this case held that there was no evidence of any intent to create such a right and there were alternate remedies available, including the tort remedy recognized by the court and a federal claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment. There is a cause of action for declaratory and injunctive relief for violation of Article I, Section 17, but no such relief was available in this case because the prisoner had been released from custody.

While the state may file a petition for review on the tort issue, and the prisoner on the constitutional issue, it's hard to see why the California Supreme Court should take this case. The tort result is hardly radical; as noted above, it's supported by the Restatement of Torts. And the constitutional ruling closely follows Katzberg. All in all, a thoughtful opinion by Judge Richman.